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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Henry R. Pollard, V*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal and Virginia courts and legislatures acted on a wide
variety of environmental issues and topics in the June 1995 to
June 1996 period. This article reviews the key environmental
developments at the federal and state level from that period
involving air, water, waste, Superfund, wetlands, and environ-
mentally related constitutional, land use, and property tort law.
II. JUDICIAL ACTION
A. Constitutional Law
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,' the Tribe sued the
State of Florida pursuant to a provision of federal Indian gam-
ing law2 based on the Indian Conmerce Clause of the United
States Constitution.' Florida countered that the law violated
the Eleventh Amendment principle of state sovereign immuni-
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1. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
2. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (Supp. 1996).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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ty4 by subjecting a state to suit by Indian tribes without the
state's consent.'
The Supreme Court conducted a two prong analysis of 1)
whether Congress made clear its intent to override state immu-
nity and, if so, 2) whether Congress' action was founded on a
proper Congressional power.' Finding that Congress had made
quite clear its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity,7
the Supreme Court then turned to the second prong of the
analysis. It found that only the Fourteenth Amendment8 and
the Interstate Commerce Clause9 of the Constitution have
formed the proper basis for state immunity abrogation." The
Court further found that the Indian Commerce Clause affords
the state no additional protections from abrogation of immunity
than the Interstate Commerce Clause."
As part of its analysis of Congressional power to override
state sovereign immunity under the Interstate Commerce
Clause, the Supreme Court revisited its decision in Pennsylva-
nia v. Union Gas Co.' In that case, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the vulnerability of states to suit for potential liability
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA7),3 popularly known
as the Superfund law. The Court held in Union Gas that states
are subject to Superfund liability and related damages. 4 The
Court reasoned that Congress' power to control interstate com-
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
5. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1121.
6. Id. at 1123. The first prong arises from the well-established principle that un-
less the abrogation of state immunity from suit in federal court is plain from the
statute, the statute will not operate to effect such a result. See Dellmuth v. Muth,
491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989). The second prong springs from the required, underlying
constitutional analysis of whether Congressional authority exists for such abrogation.
See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
7. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1123-24.
8. U.S. CONST. amend XV, §§ 1, 5. The Supreme Court upheld this constitu-
tional authority in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congressional power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause was acknowledged in the plurality
decision of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
10. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125.
11. Id. at 1127. See supra note 9.
12. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994) (as amended).
14. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5.
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merce would be undermined if it did not also hold states sub-
ject to damages under laws addressing interstate commerce con-
cerns.15 Thus, Union Gas served to extend federal Interstate
Commerce Clause authority by allowing Congress to compel
states to appear in federal court when sued by citizens under
CERCLA. 6 However, the Union Gas case was decided by a
plurality of the Court, which has led to some confusion in its
precedential value.'7
At the prompting of the State of Florida, however, the Su-
preme Court then examined the validity of the Union Gas case.
After a review of precedent cases and the language of the Elev-
enth Amendment itself," the Court ruled, five to four, that the
Union Gas decision ran counter to the long line of state sover-
eign immunity cases before it, and amounted to a mistake. The
Court explicitly reversed Union Gas,'9 finding that the Inter-
state Commerce Clause does not permit Congress to subject
states to citizen suits in federal courts." According to the
Court, the Indian Commerce Clause similarly fails to provide
Congress with the authority to subject states to suit.21
By reversing Union Gas, the Supreme Court may have dra-
matically altered the ability of citizens to sue states under
CERCLA, and even under other federal environmental laws.
The potential impact of this decision, and state reaction to suits
after this decision,' should be very interesting.
15. Id. at 20.
16. Id. at 23.
17. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1127 (1996).
18. Id. at 1127-32.
19. Id. at 1131.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. In fact, Seminole Tribe's effect has already been felt in Virginia in New River
Valley Greens v. United States Department of Transportation, No. 95-1203-R (W.D. Va.
1996). In that case, the federal district court ruled that the Virginia Department of
Transportation could not be sued for allegedly failing to comply with environmental
impact statement procedures, based in part on Seminole Tribe.
1996] 1395
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B. Air
1. Virginia's Clean Air Act Challenges
The Commonwealth continued its two-front attack on the
authority of the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") over state implementation of certain Clean Air Act
("CAA")2 programs. Virginia's constitutional challenge to CAA
Title I' and Title V,' which had been dismissed by the dis-
trict court for lack of jurisdiction,26 fared no better on appeal
at the federal circuit court level. In Virginia v. United States,
27
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on the
dismissal for largely the same reasons expressed by the district
court.
In the second line of cases,25 Virginia challenged the EPA's
authority to impose a broader standard for judicial standing"
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7679 (1994).
24. CAA Title I addresses air pollution prevention and control planning and cer-
tain overall air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7514. Virginia's Title I challenge
was based on EPA's disapproval of certain components of Virginia's State Implemen-
tation Plan concerning Virginia's proposed vehicle emissions inspection and mainte-
nance program and volatile organic compound emissions reductions. See 42 U.S.C. §
7410; Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 1996).
25. CAA Title V addresses permit requirements for stationary sources of emission
under the CAA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a-7661f. Under Title V, states can choose to imple-
ment an operating permit program at the state level after approval from EPA instead
of being subject to a federal operating permit program run by EPA. 42 U.S.C. §
7661d. Virginia's Title V challenge involved the scope of judicial standing for appeal
of Virginia's Title V operating permits. Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d at 521-22.
26. The Federal district court summarily dismissed Virginia's challenge, citing
CAA's specific requirement that appeals from agency decisions under the Act were
appealable directly to the federal circuit court. Virginia v. United States, 926 F.
Supp. 537 (E.D. Va. 1995). Hence, the federal district court ruled that it was without
jurisdiction over the matter and dismissed the case without prejudice. Id. Virginia
appealed this decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
27. 74 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 1996).
28. This challenge was filed with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals as a peti-
tion for review of EPA's final action disapproving Virginia's proposed Title V program.
See 59 Fed. Reg. 62,324 (1994). After filing its petition for review with the Fourth
Circuit, Virginia made further changes to its proposed Title V program, effectively
narrowing the dispute with EPA down to the issue of scope of standing for judicial
review of air permit decisions issued by the state under its Title V program. See
Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
29. The EPA determined, in its final action to disapprove Virginia's proposed Title
V program, that Virginia's proposed scope of standing for judicial review is too nar-
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in the Commonwealth's CAA Title V operating permit pro-
gram." Historically, Virginia's judicial standing to appeal air
permit decisions by the regulatory agency has been limited to
the site owner/permitee.3'
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit opined in its
decision of Virginia v. Browner32 that Virginia was not being
forced to accept the EPA's judicial review standard, because
Virginia had the option not to implement the Title V pro-
gram." Thus, the court of appeals reasoned, the EPA was not
mandating that Virginia accept the judicial review standard.'
Rather, Virginia could refuse to take control of the program,
leaving the EPA to run the Title V program in Virginia in-
stead.35 It was a package of incentives (and disincentives) pro-
vided within the Clean Air Act36 which in general made the
program appealing to the states to run themselves. 7 To obtain
an approved program and enjoy the additional regulatory flexi-
bility, as well as the grant monies to run the program, states
row to meet the judicial review requirements of CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6) (1994),
and implementing regulations at 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.4(b)(3)(x) and 70.7(h) (1996). The
EPA's interpretation of the judicial standing requirements called for Virginia to guar-
antee standing to any person who could meet United States Constitution Article M
standing requirements and who had participated in the public comment process of the
permit decision. See 59 Fed. Reg. 62,324 (1994).
30. The State Air Pollution Control Board has promulgated regulations for imple-
mentation of the state's Title V program- See Federal Operating Permits for Sta-
tionary Sources (Rule 8-5), 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 5-80-50 to 5-80-300 (1996) (formerly
VRR 120-08-0501).
31. Citizens for Clean Air v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 430, 412 S.E.2d 715
(1991). In fact, this standard was also the same for permit decisions by the State
Water Control Board under the Virginia Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("VPDES") program as well. See Town of Fries v. State Water Control Bd., 13 Va.
App. 213, 409 S.E.2d 634 (1991).
32. 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996).
33. Id. at 882.
34. Id. at 880-81.
35. Id. at 882.
36. Under the Clean Air Act, EPA had several sanction alternatives to choose
from to induce Virginia to adopt a program meeting EPA requirements: (i) withhold-
ing certain federal highway funds, 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1); (ii) stationary source emis-
sion offset sanction, 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(2); and (iii) Federal Title V permit program
implementation, 42 U.S.C. § 7661(a)(d)(3). The circuit court found that each of these
sanctions were constitutional and reasonably related to effecting the goals and re-
quirements of the Clean Air Act. Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 881-83 (4th Cir.
1996).
37. By meeting EPA standards for Title V implementation, the state would avoid
the sanctions and gain control of the Title V program. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b) (1994).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1393
must bring their judicial standing provisions in line with the
federal standing provisions."5 In addition, the court of appeals
found that the EPA had reasonably fashioned the standing
requirement based on the language of the CAA and the goals of
the statute. 9
As of July 1996, Virginia was in the process of determining
whether it will appeal the Fourth Circuit decision to the United
States Supreme Court. In addition, legislation from the 1996
session of the General Assembly may serve as a contingency
measure and safety net for Virginia's Title V program, by bring-
ing the standing provision of the State Air Pollution Control
Law in line with the EPA's requirements."
2. Potential-to-Emit Cases
In National Mining Ass'n v. EPA,4 the petitioners took spe-
cific exception to the EPA's approach to calculating potential to
emit for purposes of determining whether a source is a "major
source" under the hazardous air pollutant scheme of CAA sec-
tion 112.42 The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia ruled that the EPA's inclusion of all facility emis-
sions on adjacent properties was a valid application of CAA
standards." The EPA's requirement that fugitive emissions be
included in the emission calculations for determination of major
source status was likewise reasonable." However, the court of
appeals found that the EPA had failed to justify its disregard of
38. Browner, 80 F.3d at 880.
39. Id. at 878.
40. See 1996 Va. Acts 1032, cls. 2-4; see also infra notes 53, 271, 289, 295 and
301-03, and accompanying text.
41. 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994). To determine whether a source is a major source for
hazardous air pollutants, the EPA considered the following in its calculation of poten-
tial to emit:
a) inclusion of emissions from all individual sources on the contiguous facility
grounds, whether or not such individual sources were of the same type as the regu-
lated source;
b) inclusion of fugitive emissions; and
c) recognition only of federally enforceable emission restrictions and controls.
See 40 C.F.R. § 63.2 (1995) (defining "fugitive emissions," "major source," and "poten-
tial to emit").
43. National Mining Ass'n, 59 F.3d at 1359.
44. Id. at 1361.
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non-federally enforceable controls and limits, and granted a
review of this part of the rule.45 The court of appeals found
that it was not Congress' intent to exclude valid and enforce-
able state and local government controls and limits on facility
emission; instead, these controls deserve recognition by the EPA
in calculating potential to emit and, therefore, in determining
whether a facility qualified as a major source.'
The next potential-to-emit case, Chemical Manufacturers
Ass'n v. EPA,47 ended with the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia summarily vacating the EPA's rule
requiring only federally enforceable controls as part of the new
source review and prevention of significant deterioration pro-
grams of CAA Title I.'
The issue of federally enforceable controls rose again in the
context of CAA Title V operating permit requirements, with
similar rejection by the court. In Clean Air Implementation
Project v. EPA,49 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia vacated the EPA's attempt to require fed-
erally enforceable limits for purposes of calculating potential to
emit.
These decisions provide much greater flexibility to facilities
which can now obtain a state or local permit that restricts
certain operations at the facility. Such permit controls can be
used to reduce the potential to emit to below major source
levels, thereby further avoiding the costly and extensive operat-
ing permit requirements under the CAA Title V operating per-
mit program and certain Title I hazardous air pollutant
requirements.0
The EPA is currently reviewing its options after losing all
three cases. It issued an interim policy which outlines a pro-
posed rulemaking in light of the National Mining Ass'n and
Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n cases, that will alternatively
incorporate federally enforceable requirements but with greater
45. Id at 1365.
46. I&
47. Nos. 89-1514.to 89-1516, 1995 VL 650098 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
48. Id. at *2.
49. No. 96-1224, 1996 WL 393118 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
50. This type of action results in what is called a "synthetic minor" source.
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streamlining, or that will simply allow state and local permit
controls to be used in potential-to-emit calculations.5 The
EPA's interim policy is simply not to enforce the federally en-
forceable standard until it resolves the matter, probably in
early 1997.52
3. Relationship Between State Air Law and Clean Air Act
In Cate v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.,53 Cate
brought an action against the pipe line company for alleged vio-
lations of the CAA and the State Air Pollution Control Law."
Cate, who lived in Virginia adjacent to a natural gas pipeline
compressor station operated by the defendant, alleged that
emissions from the facility were in violation of a state adminis-
trative agreement issued to Transcontinental, the CAA National
Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") for nitrous oxide,
and Virginia's restriction against excessive odor emissions.55 In
addition, Cate alleged that the noise and odor from the substa-
tion constituted a nuisance under Virginia common law.5" Cate
brought the action pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the
CAA 5
7
The district court first reviewed whether the state adminis-
trative agreement could be enforced through the CAA citizen
suit section." While the district court held that the agreement
fell within the definition of "emission standards or limitations"
because the agreement created a time line for meeting compli-
51. ENVIONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA INTERiM POLICY ON FEDERAL EN-
FORCEABILITY REQUIREMENT FOR LIMITATIONS ON POTENTIAL TO EMIT (January 22,
1996).
52. Id.
53. 904 F. Supp. 526 (W.D. Va. 1995).
54. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1300 to 10.1-1322.2 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp.
1996).
55. Cate, 904 F. Supp. at 528.
56. Id
57. Id. The CAA provides for private party enforcement of the CAA against facili-
ty owners or operators under certain conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994). Transconti-
nental argued that all of plaintiffs claims should be dismissed because they are not
enforceable under the CAA, and that the nuisance claim failed to establish proper
jurisdiction and was time barred under the state's statute of limitations.
58. Cate, 904 F. Supp. at 530.
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ance,59 the district court refused to hold that the agreement
was, in fact, enforceable through a citizen suit because the
agreement was not "in effect under" the CAA or a state imple-
mentation plan as required under CAA section 7604(f).60 The
district court distinguished between citizen suits attempting to
compel compliance of NAAQS directly and those attempting to
compel compliance with enforcement mechanisms established to
enforce the NAAQS.6" Therefore, although citizen suits could
not be brought to enforce the NAAQS themselves, citizen suits
could be used to enforce administrative agreements or other
emission limits or standards in effect under the CAA or state
implementation plan designed to compel a party to reach com-
pliance with the NAAQS."2
The district court then examined whether Cate's claim that
the compressor station was in violation of the NAAQS provided
Cate with a cause of action to enforce the NAAQS as an emis-
sion limit.63 The district court reviewed the impact of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990' to determine whether
they expanded the scope of emission standards or limitations to
include NAAQS standards.' The district court found the scope
was not expanded, relying on Coalition Against Columbus Cen-
ter v. City of New York,66 and citing the EPA's position that
"NAAQS are not directly enforceable against a source." 7
The district court then looked to whether the state's odor rule
is federally enforceable under the CAA.68 Transcontinental suc-
cessfully argued that, because the odor rule is not part of the
EPA-approved state implementation plan, Cate was without
justification for pursuing enforcement of the odor rule under the
CAA. 69
59. See 42 U.S.C. §7604(f)(1).
60. Cate, 904 F. Supp. at 535.
61. Id- at 531.
62. Id- at 532.
63. Id. at 535-36.
64. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2574 (1990).
65. Cate, 904 F. Supp. at 536.
66. 967 F.2d 764, 769 (2nd Cir. 1992).
67. Cate, 904 F. Supp. at 536. For EPA's position on enforceability of NAAQS, see
57 Fed. Reg. 32,276 (1992).
68. Cate, 904 F. Supp. at 536.
69. Id at 537-38.
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The district court then moved to the merit of the nuisance
claim, determining that the chief issue in evaluating its merit
turned on the application of the statute of limitations." Cate
argued that the nuisance was not permanent, but based on the
facility's operation and therefore intermittent in nature.7 The
district court was forced to address the distinction between an
intermittent or continuous nuisance and a permanent nui-
sance.72 This issue was critical to the district court's determi-
nation of whether the statute of limitations had run on the
plaintiffs claim.73 The district court ruled the effects of the
operations including the noise and the odor, were not perma-
nent, but periodic.74 The district court then held that, because
the nature of the nuisance was intermittent, the nuisance claim
was not barred for those injuries occurring over the last five
years." However, the district court found that the nuisance
claim failed to allege federal diversity jurisdiction because the
plaintiff neglected to allege damages greater than $50,000. 76
Therefore, the district court granted Cate leave to amend his
complaint to correct the defect, if possible.77
C. Landfill Permitting Procedures
In Residents Involved in Saving the Environment, Inc.
("RISE") v. Commonwealth,78 the Virginia Court of Appeals
70. Id. at 538-39. The statute of limitations for seeking property injury damages
in Virginia is five years from the accrual of the cause of action. VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-243(B) (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1996). In turn, such cause of action ac-
crues upon the date of first injury or harm, not the discovery thereof. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-230 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
71. Cate, 904 F. Supp. at 539.
72. Id.
73. Where a nuisance is permanent and original in nature, the statute of limi-
tations begins to run on the first day of such permanent or original harm. Virginia
Hot Springs Co. v. McCray, 106 Va. 461, 56 S.E. 216 (1907). However, where the
nuisance is intermittent or periodic, a separate running of the statute of limitations
exists for each intermittent harm, allowing damages for each separate event.
Hampton Rds. Sanitation Dist. v. McDonnell, 234 Va. 235, 360 S.E.2d 841 (1987).
74. Cate, 904 F. Supp. at 539. In fact, the district court held that "the existence
of the nuisances will tend to fluctuate with prevailing winds, weather patterns, and
industrial activity." Id.
75. Id. at 539-40.
76. Id. at 540.
77. Id.
78. 22 Va. App. 532, 471 S.E.2d 796 (1996).
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examined on appeal whether the Director of the Virginia De-
partment of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") had a duty to
make a specific determination pursuant to a permitting proce-
dure of the Virginia Waste Management Act as to whether a
solid waste landfill would cause a "substantial present or poten-
tial danger to human health or the environment." 9 The court
of appeals ruled that the Director failed to make the proper
determination before issuing the solid waste management per-
mit to the permit applicant.0 The court of appeals relied on a
straightforward examination of the statute itself, as well as a
review of the statutory purposes and policies of the DEQ.8'
The court of appeals reversed the lower court's approval of the
permit issuance and remanded the matter to the trial court to
require the DEQ to make such a determination to render the
permit valid."
D. Citizen Suit Authority under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act
In Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.,3 the United States Su-
preme Court addressed the question of whether a site owner is
able to recover remediation costs incurred in past cleanups of
environmental contamination under the citizen suit provision of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA). 4 When
KFC Western began the construction of a Kentucky Fried
Chicken restaurant on property it had purchased from the
Meghrigs, it discovered petroleum contamination at the site."
KFC Western remediated the site, and three years later sought,
79. Id. at 534-35, 471 S.E.2d at 798. The statutory standard is found at VA.
CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408(1)(D) (Curn. Supp. 1996). DEQ argued that such a determina-
tion was implicit in the Director's decision to issue the permit. RISE, 22 Va. App. at
535, 471 S.E.2d at 798.
80. RISE, 22 Va. App. at 544-45, 471 S.E.2d at 803.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 545, 471 S.E.2d at 803.
83. 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
84. Id. at 1253. RCRA controls the management of solid and hazardous wastes,
as well as petroleum underground storage tank management. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i
(1994). RCRA's citizen suit section is found at 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
85. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1253. RCRA sets federal standards for the operation of
petroleum underground storage tanks and for the remediation of releases therefrom.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991.
1996] 1403
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under an equitable restitution theory, cost recovery from the
Meghrigs as the past owners through RCRA's citizen suit
section.86
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision looked to the plain
language of the RCRA citizen suit provision, and found that
citizen suits may be brought only during the presence of an
imminent endangerment at the site, not after the site has al-
ready been cleaned up. 7 Second, the Court looked to the types
of remedies afforded under the citizen suit provision and found
that they were limited to injunctive relief,' thereby excluding
cost recovery for past cleanup activities. 9 The Court's decision
also served to resolve a split between federal circuits concerning
such cost recovery actions."
E. Recovery of Cleanup Costs from the Virginia Petroleum
Storage Tank Fund
In Duncan v. Department of Environmental Quality,9 the
City of Richmond Circuit Court addressed a dispute between
Duncan and the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality
("DEQ") concerning reimbursement of cleanup costs for under-
ground storage tank ("UST") remediations and removals pursu-
ant to the Virginia Petroleum Storage Tank Fund ("Tank
Fund") regulation.92 The dispute centered around the DEQ's
interpretative policy that unless a hole is documented in the
body of an UST itself, reimbursement for the cost of removal of
the tank is not allowed." Having been denied costs associated
86. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1253.
87. Id. at 1255.
88. Id. at 1254.
89. Id However, the Court reserved judgment on whether a party could seek in-
junctive relief compelling a responsible party to pay costs as part of a proper RCRA
citizen suit. Id. at 1256.
90. The Ninth Circuit held that the citizen suit provision did allow for the recov-
ery of costs of past cleanups. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 49 F.3d 518 (1995).
Another case in the Eighth Circuit reached the opposite result. See Furrer v. Brown,
62 F.3d 1092 (1995).
91. No. HG-1094-4 (Va. Cir. Richmond City 1995).
92. 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 25-590-210 (1996) (formerly VRR 680-13-03 § 21).
93. See Petition for Appeal at 3-4, Duncan v. Department of Environmental Quali-
ty, No. HG-1094-4 (Richmond City 1995). This interpretation is not found in the Tank
Fund regulation or in DEQ's Guidance Manual: Reimbursement Claim Process for the
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with removal of five tanks located in one pit as a result of this
interpretation,9 4 Duncan appealed the initial decision by the
DEQ's staff to an internal review board, per Tank Fund policy
guidelines.95 The review board upheld the staff decision to de-
ny reimbursement of the costs.96
Duncan filed his appeal of the DEQ's final decision to the
City of Richmond Circuit Court under the Virginia Administra-
tive Process Act ("APA"),97 believing that UST corrective action
reimbursement decisions made under the UST-related portions
of the State Water Control Law ("SWCL"), 9" and supporting
regulations addressing reimbursement from the Tank Fund,99
are subject to appeal under the APA."' Duncan claimed that
the DEQ's policy of denying coverage under the Tank Fund for
removal costs for USTs which do not have documented holes
was arbitrary, capricious, and counter to the intent and lan-
guage of the SWCL and UST regulations. 0' Duncan also ar-
gued that the DEQ's denial of reimbursement for those costs
was unsupported by the evidence provided to the DEQ.0 2
The DEQ countered that applications for reimbursement from
the Tank Fund, and decisions made regarding these applica-
tions, are not subject to appeal under the APA.' s The DEQ
argued that such decisions were exempted from the APA as
"money or damage claims against the Commonwealth or agen-
cies thereoff""° or "grants of state or federal funds or proper-
Virginia Petroleum Storage Tank Fund, Form 95-0001 (March 1, 1995) [hereinafter
'Tank Fund Guidance Manual"].
94. Petition for Appeal at 2, Duncan (No. HG-1094-4).
95. Tank Fund Guidance Manual at 38-39.
96. Petition for Appeal at 3, Duncan (No. HG-1094-4).
97. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:1 to 9-6.14:25 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
98. Id. §§ 62.1-44.34:8 to -34:13 (Cum Supp. 1996).
99. 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 25-590-210 (1996) (formerly VRR 680-13-03 § 21).
100. Petition for Appeal at 1-2, 5, Duncan (No. HG-1094-4).
101. Id. at 3-4.
102. Id. at 4-5. Duncan provided expert testimony and evidence to the DEQ Recon-
sideration Panel that petroleum contamination existed in the pit from which five
USTs connected together by piping had been pulled, and that the contamination had
not been caused by any source other than the USTs or UST piping in that pit. See
id. at 3. In addition, Duncan presented expert testimony that all five USTs had to be
removed because of the extent of contamination. I&
103. See Demurrer and Motion to Dismiss at 2-6, Duncan, No. HG-1094-4 (Va. Cir.
Richmond City 1995).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(BX1) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
1996] 1405
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1393
ty." °5 In addition, the DEQ argued that construction of the
SWCL revealed that the General Assembly did not intend that
UST cleanup reimbursement decisions be subject to the
APA.'0° The DEQ also stressed that because such actions were
exempt from the APA, Tank Fund reimbursement decisions
made by the DEQ were immune from suit under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.'
The City of Richmond Circuit Court issued a letter opinion,
holding that Tank Fund reimbursements amount to grants of
state funds under the APA, thereby denying Duncan's petition
to appeal the agency decision and dismissing the case.' °8 As a
result of this finding, the circuit court never addressed the
issue of whether the DEQ's interpretative policy was reason-
able.
Duncan appears to be the first litigated case to address the
ability to appeal DEQ Tank Fund reimbursement decisions.
That such decisions are considered grants of state money (at
least in the City of Richmond Circuit), and therefore excluded
from the APA for purposes of appeal, will likely come as a
surprise to many businesses and industries. In any case, the
result of Duncan presents a particularly troublesome hurdle for
UST owners and operators seeking to obtain full reimbursement
for UST cleanup and removal costs.' °9
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(BX4) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
106. See Demurrer and Motion to Dismiss at 5-6, Duncan (No. HG-1094-4).
107. Id. at 6-8.
108. Duncan v. Department of Envtl. Quality, Chancery No. HG-1094-4 (Va. Cir.
Richmond City Dec. 27, 1995) (letter opinion). Shortly after the court rendered its
decision, Duncan filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Bill of Complaint for
Declaratory Relief, Duncan v. Department of Envtl. Quality, No. HH-172-4 (Va. Cir.
Richmond City 1996), requesting that the circuit court compel the DEQ staff to follow
the plain language of the definition of "underground storage tank" and other parts of
the SWCL. Duncan argued that the DEQ's review of reimbursement applications
amounted to a ministerial, and not a discretionary, function. Id. Duncan also argued
that the DEQ's requirement that holes in the underground storage tanks be docu-
mented was contradicted by the SWCL. Id. Duncan also requested declaratory judg-
ment that DEQ was required to follow the definition of "underground storage tank"
contained in the SWCL. Id. However, after further pleadings were filed by both par-
ties, Duncan terminated the case before the circuit court ruled on his petition.
109. This can be especially troubling as the costs of removing and disposing of
remaining UST contents and the removal and disposal of the USTs themselves are
often the most substantial costs incurred as part of the corrective action process. In




In United States v. Olin Corp." the federal district court
was called to review a consent decree between the EPA and
several potentially responsible Superfund parties in an other-
wise typical Superfund case involving groundwater contamina-
tion in Alabama. The district court's ruling turned out to be a
very atypical decision that raises serious questions about
CERCLA's retroactive effect and applicability to purely intra-
state contamination.
The district court looked to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products"' for con-
trolling precedent as to the presumption against intended retro-
active effect of federal law." The district court ruled after an
extensive legal and historical analysis of previous cases ad-
dressing CERCLA retroactivity,"' and application of
Landgraf," that Congress did not expressly provide for the
retroactive effect of CERCLA, either through language in the
statute"' or in its legislative history."' The district court al-
so concluded that CERCLA could still function as intended
without retroactive effect."
In addition, the Olin court held that application of CERCLA
to purely local contaminated sites without impact on interstate
commerce exceeded the Interstate Commerce Clause authority
of Congress. m  Relying on United States v. Lopez,m  the dis-
trict court opined that in the case at bar there was no link
cleanup of UST sites without first removing the UST from the ground. As a result,
UST owners and operators are put in the position of necessarily having to remove an
UST to conduct the investigation and remediation of the site in accordance with the
SWCL and UST regulations, only to find that the removal costs are not eligible for
reimbursement under the DEQ's policy.
110. 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
111. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
112. Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1511-12.
113. Id at 1507-11.
114. Id at 1511-12.
115. Id at 1512-13.
116. Id. at 1513-16.
117. Id. at 1519.
118. Id at 1533.
119. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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between the cleanup of the site and economic activity substan-
tially affecting interstate commerce because of the local nature
of the contamination. The district court also held that there
was no jurisdictional component in CERCLA to overcome the
constitutional weakness."
The Olin decision is based on an extensive review of
CERCLA's history and Supreme Court decisions which address
the retroactivity and Interstate Commerce Clause issues. Other
courts may therefore give it serious consideration. Current
CERCLA defendants will no doubt begin to cite Olin in their
pleadings and in settlement discussions with the EPA. Howev-
er, the EPA has filed an appeal, so Olin's full impact is still
uncertain.
Westfarm Associates L.P. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission" presented an opportunity for the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals to address whether a publicly owned
treatment works ("POTW") could be considered a "facility," and
whether discharges of hazardous substances from cracks and
other faults in its sewer pipes amounted to "releases of haz-
ardous substances," under CERCLA.'
Westfarm attempted to sell certain property which it had
held for real estate development purposes, but an environmen-
tal investigation related to the sale revealed perchloroethylene
("PCE") in the groundwater of the property.' Westfarm's in-
120. Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1533.
121. Id
122. 66 F.3d 669 (4th Cir. 1995).
123. The court of appeals also examined whether the POTW could enjoy sovereign
immunity in the face of alleged negligent acts or omissions in the construction, main-
tenance, and operation of the sewer lines. The court of appeals looked to specific
Maryland law, which waived the POTW's sovereign immunity for purposes of neg-
ligence claims. Id. at 684. The court of appeals found that while the POTW had no
common law duty to "enact or enforce regulations which might prevent POTW users
from discharging perchloroethylene (PCE) into the sewer system," the court also found
that the public duty doctrine did not remove POTW from the common law duty to
take due care in the maintenance and operation of its sewer system. Id. at 685.
Finding that the evidence presented during the case substantiated claims that the
sewer was not constructed in a workmanlike manner, and that the POTW had failed
to maintain the sewers in proper condition even after having gained knowledge that
the sewer lines had been damaged or cracked, the court of appeals held that the
POTW was in fact negligent and therefore liable to Westfarm for property damages
associated with the release of PCE onto its property. Id at 683-88.
124. Id at 673-74. PCE is a toxic organic solvent used extensively in dry cleaning
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vestigations further revealed the source of PCE to be a nearby
dry cleaning trade association research facility that had routine-
ly disposed of waste PCE into the public sewer system after
completing research projects, amounting to an average of three
gallons per year.' The sewer line leading from the research
facility joined with a sewer main line which then subsequently
ran near the Westfarm property.2 6 Westfarm inspected the
sewer lines and identified cracks and gaps in the sewer line
near the Westfarm property. These defects in the line allowed
PCE to escape into the soil and the groundwater.' 7 Expert
testimony provided by Westfarm established that the sewer line
had not been built in a workmanlike manner and had not been
properly maintained over time.' In addition, there was evi-
dence that the sewer authority knew that the research facility
was storing PCE on its property and placing PCE into the sew-
er lines per an industrial discharge permit granted by the
POTW." 9 The POTW is a state agency under Maryland
law. 3
0
The court of appeals looked to whether the sewer pipes
owned by the POTW could be considered a "facility" as that
term is defined under CERCOLA.'' The court found that, while
the sewer pipes belonging to the POTW did not fit neatly into
the definition of facility,"' CERCLA intended to include local
and state agency POTW's within its liability scheme.'3 3 The
court of appeals, examining CERCLA in its entirety and specifi-
cally relying on Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,"M found that
Congress intended to include state and local government agen-





129. Id at 675-76.
130. Id at 676.
131. Id. at 678-80.
132. Id. at 678. CERCLA defines "facility" to include any "pipe or pipeline (in-
cluding any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works)." 42 U.S.C. §
9601(9) (1994).
133. Westfarm, 66 F.3d at 678.
134. 491 U.S. 1, 8 (1989), rev'd in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct.
1114 (1996); see supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text.
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cies within the scope of liability under CERCLA."1 However,
the recent Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida,'36 discussed above in this article, 7 casts doubt
on this part of the Fourth Circuit's holding. Seminole Tribe di-
rectly reversed Union Gas," which involved Superfund liabili-
ty. To the degree that Seminole Tribe found that Congress'
attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause was an invalid exercise of congressional
power,'39 the Fourth Circuit may have come to a different con-
clusion if it had the Seminole Tribe decision before it at the
time of Westfarm.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also found that the
leaking of PCE into the soils and groundwater from the
POTW's sewer lines amounted to a "release" under
CERCLA.' 4  The court of appeals declined to follow the
POTW's assertion that it should be able to enjoy the innocent
landowner's defense under CERCLA," because the POTW
failed to produce sufficient evidence of due care in its mainte-
nance of the sewer lines and failed to take steps to prevent
what was a foreseeable disposal of the PCE from the research
facility into its sewer lines."
In Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer & Lake Erie Railroad
Co.,' the district court addressed several challenges to a cost
recovery and contribution claim filed by Abex against several
railroad parties in a Superfund action involving a foundry pre-
viously acquired by Abex. The case involved the sale of used
and worn railroad journal bearings to Abex for reprocessing in
the manufacturing of new bearings.'" The worn bearings were
sold by the railroad companies to Abex, which melted them
down to remove dirt, grease, and extraneous metal contami-
135. Westfarm, 66 F.3d at 678.
136. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
137. See supra part HA
138. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
139. Id. at 1126.
140. Westfarm, 66 F.3d at 680-81.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1994).
142. Westfarm, 66 F.3d at 682-83.
143. 921 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Va. 1996).
144. Id. at 339.
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nants, and then recast them.' After further addition of other
component metals, the recasting process vented off particular
material which was alleged to have accumulated on its proper-
ty.'" Abex then formed new bearings by pouring the molten
ingredients into molds formed from sand.14' After the sand
molds had been used to the point where they were no longer
viable, Abex removed the sand and placed it on the back of its
property."
After settling with the EPA to address the removal of con-
tamination from the site under CERCLA section 106,'14 Abex
and related parties brought contribution and cost recovery
actions pursuant to CERCLA section 107(a)'5 against the rail-
road defendants.'" The defendants argued several defenses,
two of which deserve note. First, the railroads argued that the
bearings sold to Abex should not be considered hazardous sub-
stances simply because the bearings contain elements which are
listed as hazardous substances. 2 Second, the railroads argued
that their actions should not be "disposal or treatment" of a
hazardous substance under CERCLA because the bearings were
sold to Abex as valuable raw material in its recasting
process.'
The district court rejected the railroad's arguments, finding
that the distinction between the bearings and their component
metal as hazardous substances was too tenuous.' The dis-
trict court also found that the railroad defendants failed to
counter Abex's claim that the bearings' component metals had




149. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). This section provides for the recovery of cleanup costs
incurred in accordance with the National Contingency Plan from the current owner or
operator of a facility, anyone who arranged for the transportation to, treatment, or
disposal of hazardous substances at a facility, or transported hazardous substances to
a facility, or a past owner or operator who contributed to the release of hazardous
substances. Id. Certain defenses do exist, however. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
151. Pneumo Abex, 921 F. Supp. at 341.
152. Id at 342-43.
153. Id. at 343-46.
154. Id at 344-46.
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contributed to the facility's contamination.' The district court
also discounted the defendants' "useful product" argument by
likening the worn journal bearings to spent lead acid batter-
ies. ' The district court relied on Chesapeake & Potomac Tele-
phone Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., which held that such
used batteries did not constitute a "useful product" because the
seller did not have any further use for them." In Peck Iron,
the district court concluded that the purpose of the transfer of
such batteries was to dispose of them rather than for any par-
ticular future use."59 In fact, the Pneumo Abex court ruled
that the "only remaining use [of the bearings] was to serve as a
part of' the manufacturing process which contributed to con-
tamination of the site. 60 In conjunction with the "useful prod-
uct" argument, the district court similarly dismissed the
railroads' arguments that they had not arranged for the dis-
posal or treatment of the railroad bearings. 6' The district
court dispensed with this claim by finding that the purpose of
the transfer of the railroad bearings to Abex was to have them
melted down and formed into new bearings, constituting "treat-
ment" under CERCLA.' 6' The district court also found that
the railroads' actions amounted to "disposal" of hazardous sub-
stances, because the bearings were ultimately discarded through
particulate emissions or actual release onto the grounds of the
foundry.16
The district court addressed another argument made by the
defendants that plaintiffs were restricted to a CERCLA section
113' contribution action, and were barred from bringing a
CERCLA section 10765 cost recovery action. 66 The district
155. Id. at 343.
156. Id. at 344.
157. 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992).
158. Id. at 1275.
159. Pneumo Abex, 921 F. Supp. at 344 (citing Peck Iron, 814 F. Supp. at 1274).
160. Id. at 344.
161. Id. at 344-46.
162. Id. at 345.
163. Id. at 345-46.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1994). This section permits potentially responsible parties
to seek contribution from other potentially responsible parties.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
166. Pneumo Abex, 921 F. Supp. at 346. The distinction between these two causes
of action is significant in the scope of liability which can be shifted from the plaintiff
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court dismissed the defendants' arguments that plaintiffs, as
potentially responsible parties themselves, were restricted to a
CERCLA section 113 cause of action.16' However, the district
court structured the shift of liability under the CERCLA section
107 action in a manner similar to that under Peck Iron.'
Thus, the defendants had the burden to establish that the
harm to the environment allegedly contributed by the railroad
bearings was divisible from other contamination, such that the
court could establish a reasonable basis for apportionment of
the liability.69 In addition, the district court refused to shift
the plaintiffs' share of liability to the defendants, although
orphan shares associated with defunct or unknown contributors
to contamination would be shifted to the defendant.'
G. Water and Oil Pollution
In National Shipping Co. v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., "
the district court addressed an oil tanker company's claim
against a tug boat company related to an alleged negligent
collision between the tug and the tanker which resulted in the
release of 9,000 gallons of fuel oil into the Elizabeth River.'
National Shipping Co. ("NSCSA") brought its cause of action
under four theories of law: general maritime law, the Virginia
State Water Control Law,"3 common law negligence, and the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990.' The release of the fuel oil result-
ed in an extensive cleanup effort in the Elizabeth River and
to the defendant. Under a CERCLA § 107 action, the defendants are subject to joint
and several liability, whereas CERCLA § 113(f) provides for a division of liability
based on relative contribution to the harm. Id.
167. Id. at 347.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 348.
170. Id.
171. 924 F. Supp. 1436 (E.D. Va. 1996).
172. Id. at 1439.
173. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.34:18(CX4) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
174. 33 U.S.C. § 2701 to 2761 (1994).
1996] 1413
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1393
along the shoreline, with total cleanup expenses of over $1
million. 75
The district court first examined the interplay between the
Oil Pollution Act ("OPA") contribution provision 76 and com-
mon law contribution under general maritime law. 77 The dis-
trict court dispensed with NSCSA's general maritime claims as
being preempted by OPA, because OPA specifically provides for
a cause of action against other liable parties for remediation
expenses and third party compensation.'78 However, the dis-
trict court preserved NSCSA's action against Moran for collision
damages, which are excluded from exemption under OPA and
preserved under maritime law.'79 The district court summarily
dismissed NSCSA's State Water Control Law claim, again based
on the theory of preemption. 80
The district court took up the interaction between OPA's
contribution provision and state common law negligence and
contribution.'8' The district court dismissed Moran's counter-
claim of negligence against NSCSA.'82 With respect to the con-
tribution claim, the district court found that OPA's savings
clause" did not preserve the plaintiffs ability to seek damag-
es over and above the contribution limit set forth in OPA.'
The district court found instead that it was Congress' intent to
permit only those present who had been damaged by an oil
spill to seek damages under state law in addition to those per-
mitted by OPA.' The district court interpreted Congress' in-
tent of this added level of recovery not to extend to benefit the
responsible owner whose vessel was involved in a collision."
The district court also rejected NSCSA's common law indem-
nification argument, finding that in order to enjoy the benefit of
175. Moran, 924 F. Supp. at 1453.
176. 33 U.S.C. § 2709.
177. Moran, 924 F. Supp. at 1447.
178. Id.
179. Id at 1453-54.
180. Id at 1447.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1455.
183. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a).
184. Moran, 924 F. Supp. at 1447-48; see 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (1994).




such an argument, NSCSA must stand in the shoes of a party
who is legitimately able to bring a common law action.' 7
NSCSA was not such a party, because it was not one of the
victims of the oil spills as set forth in the OPA's savings
clause.'
Finally, the district court established that NSCSA could re-
cover collision costs from Moran under general maritime law, as
the OPA's contribution provisions did not extend to these types
of claims, and therefore did not preempt general maritime
law." The district court found that the tug was operated neg-
ligently, causing the collision and the resulting oil spill, there-
fore justifying NSCSA's recovery of collision damages from
Moran." °
H. Wetlands
Under the case name Cargill, Inc. v. United States,"8 the
United States Supreme Court refused to entertain an appeal of
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Leslie Salt Co. v. United
States, 2 which addressed whether abandoned salt pits which
filled with water and provided temporary habitat for migratory
birds for a only a few months of the year constituted wetlands
under the Clean Water Act. The Ninth Circuit had held that
such pits, despite their temporary value as a habitat for migra-
tory birds, nonetheless constituted a wetlands under the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers' wetlands regulations. 93
The preamble to the Corps' 1986 regulations indicates that
waters of the United States include those waters which serve
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1453.
190. Id. at 1452-53.
191. 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995).
192. 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Cargill, Inc. v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 407 (1995).
193. Id. at 1391; see 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1996). The Corps' definition, duplicated
under EPA's wetlands regulations, reads as follows "(3) All other waters such as
intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa, lakes, or natural ponds, the
use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce."
40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) (1996).
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as habitats for birds listed under the migratory bird treaties or
for other migratory birds which cross state lines.' Although
the preamble could not be considered an official regulation
because it had not been subjected to notice and comment proce-
dures under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 the
Ninth Circuit found that the Corps' interpretation of the CWA
amounted to a reasonable interpretive rulemaking, which nor-
mally falls outside of notice and comment rulemaking proce-
dures.' The court of appeals also found that the Corps' inter-
pretation was reasonable given the nexus between the flights of
migratory birds and the interstate commerce provision of the
"waters through the United States" included in the definition of
"wetlands" under the Corps' regulations. 7 The court of ap-
peals further found that the Corps' interpretation was reason-
able and, therefore, was given due deference. 9 ' The court of
appeals relied in this respect on United States v. Bayview
Homes, Inc. "
I. Endangered Species
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon,"' the United States Supreme Court held that
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, in its endangered
species regulations, properly interpreted the meaning of "harm
to endangered species" to include acts which result in "signif-
icant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavior-
al patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."0' This
particular part of the regulation, relating to the protection of
the northern spotted owl, a threatened species under the regu-
lations, was challenged by landowners, loggers and others de-
194. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986).
195. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
196. Leslie Salt, 55 F.3d at 1394.
197. Id. at 1393-94.
198. Id at 1394-95.
199. 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
200. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
201. Sweet Home Chapter, 115 S. Ct. at 2407. The regulatory definition is found at
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
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pendent on the forest industries in the Pacific Northwest."2
The Supreme Court examined three main points in finding
that the regulation was proper. First, the Court held that the
Service's interpretation of "harm" as included in the Endan-
gered Species Act ("ESA") definition of "take"0 3 was reason-
able, giving a meaning to the term "harm" as used in that
definition and not rendering it mere surplusage.'" The Court
then found that the ESA's broad purpose, to protect endangered
species against activities which can cause their degradation or
diminution in numbers, supported the Secretary's interpretation
to extend protection to species' habitats.0 5 The Court declined
to follow the respondents' argument that other portions of the
ESA, which permit certain takings of endangered species inci-
dental to other lawful activities, did not support the contention
that Congress intended habitat modifications to be outside the
scope of prohibited activities which could lead to the death or
diminution in numbers of endangered species.0 ' The Court
further rejected an argument by the respondents that legislative
history supported a different conclusion.0 7 Finally, the Court
recognized that broad discretion had been granted to the Secre-
tary of the Interior to develop regulations to carry out the ESA,
providing a foundation for deference to the Service in interpret-
ing the ESA to achieve its purposes, including the Secretary's
interpretation in the case at hand. 8 Justice Scalia offered a
vigorous dissent, finding that the Secretary of the Interior had
clearly exceeded the scope of the ESA when he interpreted
habitat modification as a form of harm and therefore a form of
prohibited taking under the ESA.Y
202. Sweet Home Chapter, 115 S. Ct. at 2410.
203. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994) 'ft]he term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct." Id.
204. Sweet Home Chapter, 115 S. Ct. at 2413.
205. Id. at 2413-14.
206. Id. at 2417-18.
207. Id. at 2416-18.
208. Id. at 2418.
209. Id. at 2423 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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J. Environmental Torts and Damages
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia considered an environmentally related personal injury
action in Cavallo v. Star Enterprise,21 where plaintiff Cavallo
alleged that vapors emitted from released aviation jet fuel at
Star Enterprise's facility triggered respiratory and allergic sen-
sitivity to petroleum vapors. In a motion in limine filed by the
defense, the district court examined whether the Daubert rule
for admission of expert testimony21' compelled the court to ex-
clude plaintiffs expert's opinions on the relationship between
the volatile organic compound released from the plant and the
plaintiffs injuries." The district court focused on the "second
prong" under the Daubert rule, which related to the "fit" of the
scientific validity of the theory or method used by the expert to
support his opinion and the situation in the case at hand."'
After reviewing the scientific evidence relied upon by the
plaintiffs experts, the district court found that the evidence,
and the scientific conclusions established by that evidence, were
not transferable or applicable to the case at hand due to (i) the
lack of established similarity between chemical exposures in the
underlying studies and the facts of the case, (ii) the uncertainty
as to the exact nature of the chemical compounds to which the
plaintiff had been exposed, and (iii) available information on
the type of material involved in the release establishing that
high thresholds of exposure are normally necessary for manifes-
tations of injury to arise. 4 The district court then upheld the
defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the exclu-
sion of plaintiffs expert's testimony."5
210. 892 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1995).
211. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (ruling
that the courts must prevent expert scientific testimony from being admitted where
the expert testimony is not both relevant and reliable).
212. Cavallo, 892 F. Supp. at 759-60.
213. I& at 761-62.
214. Id. at 763-73.
215. Id. at 774.
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Y. Land Use and Related Environmental Cases
The Virginia Court of Appeals addressed, in Lawless v. Coun-
ty of Chesterfield,216 whether the owner and operator of an un-
authorized landfill could be cited for more than one day's worth
of violations of a county zoning ordinance addressing landfill
operations. The court of appeals looked at Chesterfield County
Code section 21.1-5(b)(1)--providing that each day's violation of
a conditional use permit issued pursuant to that section consti-
tutes a separate offense-and whether that county Code section
violated Dillon's Rule. 1 The court of appeals examined Title
15.1 of the Virginia Code, which permits local governments to
adopt and implement zoning ordinances," to see whether
there was any express or necessarily implied power granted to
local governments to seek individual misdemeanor counts for
each day of noncompliance.2 ' The court of appeals compared
the misdemeanor penalty authority under Title 15.1 to the
civil sanction authority under that same title," and found
that the civil sanction authority permitted localities to assess
civil penalties on a per-day basis, up to $3,000. The court of
appeals, however, found no such language in the criminal viola-
tion provision of Title 15.1.' It also found that the locality's
interest in applying criminal sanctions on a per-day basis was
not essential to the adequate enforcement of the zoning ordi-
nance. Therefore, the court of appeals held that the County
Code section enforcing compliance with the zoning ordinances
through per-day criminal sanctions "violat[ed] Dillon's Rule and
[was] void."' u Lawless's second conviction under the County
Code section, based on the same facts that were applied in his
first conviction, was therefore reversed and dismissed .21  This
case casts serious doubt on any locality's effort to apply per-day
216. 21 Va. App. 495, 465 S.E.2d 153 (1995).
217. Id. at 497, 465 S.E.2d at 154.
218. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-427 to -503.3 (RepL Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
219. Lawless, 21 Va. App. at 497, 465 S.E.2d at 155.
220. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491(e) (Cur. Supp. 1996).
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1499.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
222. Lawless, 21 Va. App. at 497, 465 S.E.2d at 155.
223. Id. at 502, 465 S.E.2d at 156.
224. Id. at 503, 465 S.E.2d at 156.
225. Id.
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criminal sanctions for zoning violations, including those ad-
dressing landfills or other environmentally related land use is-
sues, where the same facts are used to demonstrate the multi-
day violation.
In Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v.
Town of Front Royal,228 a landowner sought compensation for
lost value of property and business income as a result of the
defendant's refusal to extend sewer utilities to his properties,
despite an annexation court order requiring the town to con-
struct such water and sewer lines. After a very convoluted
procedural history before Virginia and federal courts," the
federal district court concluded that it was in a position to
address plaintiffs claims for damages arising from a regulatory
taking as a result of the town's refusal to install water and
sewer lines as previously ordered by the annexation court.'
Plaintiffs action was pursued in the context of a section
198329 action against the town and town officials for their
refusal to follow the orders of the annexation court.20 The
district court found that the plaintiff had "utilized the proce-
dures available pursuant to Virginia law to seek compensation
for an alleged taking," but that he had been "denied just com-
pensation pursuant to the procedures of Virginia law."3' The
district court also recognized that the factual situation of the
case at bar did not compare exactly to previous instances of
regulatory taking.12 However, the district court determined
that the case at bar had enough similarities to such cases to
warrant application of regulatory taking principles to the
action.'
The district court then examined the various regulatory tak-
ing principles which had been established in recent years by
the United States Supreme Court, including the principle by
which a regulatory taking does not necessarily have to be of a
226. 922 F. Supp. 1131 (W.D. Va. 1996).
227. Id. at 1135-37.
228. Id. at 1137.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
230. Id. at 1143.





permanent nature in order to be compensable." The district
court also looked to Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion' for the general principle that the purpose of the Tak-
ings Clause"5 is to prevent unfair and unjust burdening of
private individuals with public responsibilities. 7 The district
court also relied on Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United
States 8 for the proposition that individuals should be able to
make investment decisions on the basis that the government
will not unfairly impose public burdens on private individuals
or act arbitrarily and capriciously such that reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations would be frustrated."'9 The district
court found that the town had refused to follow the annexation
court's order to extend sewer and water, thereby acting arbi-
trarily and capriciously, resulting in the loss of investment-
backed expectations of the plaintiff," The district court also
examined whether realistic alternative uses of the property
were available, such that the takings may not have amounted
to a complete taking." Finding that the property was in an
industrially zoned area where alternative uses were unlikely
and economically unrealistic,' the district court held that a
regulatory taking of the plaintiffs property without just com-
pensation had occurred as a result of the town's refusal to im-
plement the annexation court's order.'
The district court then addressed the substantive due process
issues within the section 1983 action filed by the plaintiff.24
The district court concluded that, based on the history associat-
ed with the annexation court's order to extend sewer and water
to the plaintiffs property, the plaintiff had a recognizable inter-
est in the provision of such sewer and water lines to its proper-
234. Id at 1145-46. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
235. 483 U.S. 825, 836 n.4 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 49, (1960)).
236. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
237. Town of Front Royal, 922 F. Supp. at 1148.
238. 18 F.3d 1560 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
239. Town of Front Royal, 922 F. Supp. at 1148.
240. Id. at 1151.
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ties.' The district court then looked again to the town's re-
fusal to implement the annexation court's order, again viewing
such refusal as "manifest arbitrariness and capriciousness in
depriving the plaintiff of that cognizable property interest."'
The district court also found that equal protection was denied
to the plaintiff, because the defendant could establish no legiti-
mate state interest which was furthered by its refusal to com-
ply with the annexation court's order to extend sewer and wa-
ter to the plaintiffs property.247
As to damages, the district court recognized that between the
time the plaintiffs action had originally started and the time of
the court's decision in the case at bar, the town had in fact
extended sewer and water to the plaintiff, such that any dam-
ages associated with the denial of sewer and water would be
associated with that time period when denial affected the tak-
ing.' The district court based this calculation on the differ-
ences in fair market value between the time of the taking and
the time after the taking ceased, plus a reasonable rate of re-
turn on the difference in market value."9 The district court
also awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff."°
While the facts and procedural history in Town of Front
Royal appear to be unique in many ways compared to other
regulatory takings cases, the district court found that the
overarching principles of past regulatory takings cases were
nonetheless applicable to a situation where a taking was not of
a permanent nature, and where there was demonstrable arbi-
trary and capricious denial of development of a vested property
interest. This case may therefore open new doors for recovering
compensation in future regulatory taking cases.
245. Id. at 1150-51.
246. Id. at 1151.
247. Id. at 1152.
248. Id
249. Id. at 1152-53.
250. Id- at 1153.
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L. Environmental Crimes and Criminal Procedure
The Fourth Circuit expanded the court's ability to consider
conduct outside of the predicate acts of an environmental crimi-
nal conviction in setting the sentence for the defendant. In
United States v. Pizzuto,"' the court of appeals ruled that
conduct related to dismissed criminal counts which demon-
strates the defendant conducted repeated illegal acts or related
crimes could be considered when determining whether enhance-
ment of the sentence for the actual conviction is appropriate
under the federal sentencing guidelines. 2 By this ruling, the
court of appeals extended its holding in United States v. Wil-
liams' to environmental crimes.
M. Significant Miscellaneous Cases
In Mortarino v. Consultant Engineering Services, Inc.,' the
Supreme Court of Virginia examined whether constructive fraud
occurred in the purchase of property subsequently found to
contain wetlands. Mortarino and his business, MGT Virginia,
Inc., desired to purchase a certain piece of property and took
steps through a straw man, James Morrow, to purchase the
property. 5 The purchase agreement between Mortarino and
Morrow established that the purchase of the property was con-
tingent on a finding that there were no wetlands on the proper-
ty which would impede its developmentY6 Morrow hired Con-
sultant Engineering Services to conduct a wetlands survey of
the property, who then retained Clayton Bernick to conduct the
actual field survey of the property. 7 The resulting wetlands
report issued to Morrow by Consulting Engineering Services
stated that there were no wetlands on the property." 8 Howev-
251. No. 94-5433, 1995 WL 610346 (4th Cir. Oct. 18, 1995).
252. Id. at *2-3; see United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§
2Q1.2(b)(1)(A) & 1Bl.3(a) (November 1993).
253. 880 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1989).
254. 251 Va. 289, 467 S.E.2d 778 (1996).
255. Id. at 291, 467 S.E.2d at 780.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 292, 467 S.E.2d at 780.
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er, this statement was quallifed by the following language: "the
presence of wetlands are [sic] so opinionated that there is
always the possibility that a different interpretation could be
made."' 9 Based in part on the report, Morrow made arrange-
ments to acquire the property, and then transferred his interest
in the arrangement to Mortarino, who eventually purchased the
property from the seller.26° Subsequent evaluation of the prop-
erty revealed that nearly all of the property was considered
jurisdictional wetlands under the Corps of Engineers' wetlands
guidelines.26' The Corps later confirmed this assessment.262
As a result, Mortarino was prevented from developing the prop-
erty.2
63
Mortarino brought a constructive fraud case against the de-
fendants, alleging that he had reasonably relied on the findings
of the initial wetlands report as a factual statement of the
nature of the property. The supreme court narrowed the issue
to whether the wetlands findings were factual representations
or opinions. 26 Citing Saxby v. Southern Land Co.,21 the su-
preme court hinged its decision on the rule that only misrepre-
sentations of fact can form the basis of constructive fraud.2
The supreme court then looked to whether statements made in
the wetlands report were statements of fact or representations
of opinion.26' The supreme court held that the statements
were "unambiguous representations of the present quality or
character of the property and, thus, are representations of fact,
and not mere expressions of opinion."2' The supreme court
dismissed the qualifying language in the report related to
wetlands findings being opinionated, holding that the end result
of the report was a factual representation on which the plaintiff
reasonably relied in his purchase of the property, and for which
the purchase contract afforded a remedy.26 However, the su-
259. Id. (quoting the wetlands report).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. I& at 292, 467 S.E.2d at 780-81.
263. Id., 467 S.E.2d at 781.
264. Id., 467 S.E.2d at 781.
265. 109 Va. 196, 198, 63 S.E. 423, 424 (1909).
266. Mortarino, 251 Va. at 293, 467 S.E.2d at 781.
267. Id. at 293-94, 467 S.E.2d at 781.
268. Id. at 294, 467 S.E.2d at 781.
269. Id_, 467 S.E.2d at 781-82.
1424
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
preme court found that Mortarino had failed to plead all of the
elements of a cause of action for constructive fraud, such that it
could not grant relief."' The supreme court instead reversed
the trial court's refusal to allow Mortarino to amend his
pleadings to reflect all of the elements of constructive fraud as
an abuse of discretion.Y Therefore, Mortarino was granted a
second chance in his constructive fraud action, with the benefit
of the supreme court's finding that the wetlands report
amounted to a representation of fact and not opinion.
The Mortarino case is likely to have a significant impact on a
prospective purchaser's ability to obtain damages or rescission
of a land purchase contract based on incorrect findings of envi-
ronmental conditions which were relied upon by the purchaser.
The impact of this case would seem to have immediate effect on
not only wetlands cases, but also other environmental reports




Congress's environmental enactments from June 1995 to June
1996 were few, but Congress did attempt to address several
environmental issues. It continued its efforts to reform the
Comprehensive Environmental Restoration, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA),272  also known as the
Superfund law, feeling growing pressure from industry to soften
liability provisions and correct the failure of CERCLA to ad-
dress site cleanups in a cost-effective and efficient manner.273
270. Id. at 295, 467 S.E.2d at 782.
271. Id. 295-96, 467 S.E.2d at 782-83.
272. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). CERCLA provides for a nationwide program of
assessing liability for, and cleaning up, abandoned contaminated sites and dumps.
Liability under CERCLA has generally been held to be strict, joint and several, and
retroactive. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167, 171, 173 (4th Cir.
1988).
273. As of June 1996, there remained significant differences on issues of repealing
retroactive liability and natural resources damages assessments. See 27 Env. Rptr.
475 (BNA June 21, 1996).
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Congress also worked to reauthorize the Safe Drinking Water
Act ("SDWA) 27 4  and the Coastal Zone Management Act
("CZMA').275 Three significant proposed changes to the SDWA
include modification of the contaminant listing re-
quirements,276 enhancing community right-to-know reporting
by public water suppliers,277 and establishing a revolving find
to finance public water supply system upgrades."'
B. Virginia
In the spring of 1996, the General Assembly undertook a
great variety of environmentally related legislative measures.
1. Water Law
Senate Bill 480279 expanded the State Water Control Law
("SWCL) 280 self-reporting responsibilities of wastewater dis-
charge permit holders. 1 Permitted facilities must now report
the discharge of prohibited wastes. 2 into or upon state wa-
ters" or drain systems"' or a discharge which may reason-
274. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1994).
275. Coastal Zone Protection Act of 1996, Pub. Law 104-150, 110 Stat. 1380 (1996)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
276. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, §§ 102-
03, 110 Stat. 1613, 1617-23 (1996).
277. Id. § 114, 110 Stat. at 1636-41.
278. Id. § 130, 110 Stat. at 1662-72.
279. S.B. 480, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
62.1-44.5 (Cum. Supp. 1996)).
280. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.2 to -44.34:28 (Repl. Vol. 1994 & Cur. Supp.
1996).
281. Section 62.1-44.5(A) provides that "[e]xcept in compliance with a certificate
issued by the [State Water Control] Board, no person shall discharge industrial
waste, sewage and other wastes or noxious or deleterious substances into or upon
state waters, or otherwise negatively change the physical, chemical or biological char-
acteristics of such waters which could adversely affect public health or the environ-
ment or recognized uses of the waters for domestic or industrial consumption or rec-
reation or any other use." VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.5(A) (Cure. Supp. 1996). There-
fore, those parties wishing to discharge such materials into state waters must first
receive a certificate of discharge, or permit, from the State Water Control Board for
such activity.
282. Prohibited wastes include "sewage, industrial waste, other wastes or any nox-
ious or deleterious substance." VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.5(B) (Cum- Supp. 1996).
283. "State waters" is defined as "all water, on the surface and under the ground,
wholly or partially within or bordering the Commonwealth or within its jurisdiction."
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ably be expected to enter state waters in violation of the SWCL
or regulations promulgated thereunder' within twenty-four
hours to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality
("DEQ")G or the local emergency services coordinator2 7 and
appropriate federal authorities. Following this immediate notifi-
cation, written notification must follow to the DEQ director
within forty-eight hours.' These requirements are similar to
those in existence for the improper or unpermitted discharge of
oil to state waters.29
2. Enforcement and Judicial Review
House Bill 1008290 provides significant new authority for the
DEQ to issue unilaterally "special orders" requiring certain
corrective measures to be taken by a facility in response to
alleged violations of any laws under the jurisdiction of the
SWCB, the State Air Pollution Control Board ("SAPCB"), 291
and the Virginia Waste Management Board ('CVWMB") .1 2 Any
action contemplated under the special order must be able to be
VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.3 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
284. "Drain systems" is not defined within the statute.
285. The State Water Control Board ("SWCB") is the citizen board charged with
oversight of SWCL regulatory implementation. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.7 to
-44.15:5 (Repl. Vol. 1994 & Cum. Supp. 1996). The SWCB has promulgated numerous
regulations related to the discharge of industrial waste, sewage and other wastes into
or upon state waters, including the Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("VPDES") regulations, found at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 25-30-10 to 25-30-550 (1996)
(formerly VRR 680-14-02 §§ 1.1 to 10.1).
286. The DEQ is the regulatory agency established to oversee the day-to-day man-
agement of the water protection laws and regulations of the state, and serves to
support the SWCB in its regulatory capacity. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1182 to
-1197 (Repl. Vol. 1994 and Cum. Supp. 1996).
287. Each locality has an emergency services coordinator or director to oversee
local emergencies, which can include significant discharges or releases of harmful
wastewaters into the environment. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.19 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
288. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.5(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
289. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:19 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
290. H.B. 1008, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
10.1-1186.10 (Cum Supp. 1996)).
291. The SAPCB oversees the implementation of Virginia's air protection laws and
regulations. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1301 to -1307.01 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp.
1996).
292. The VWMB oversees the operations and promulgates the state regulations of
the various solid and hazardous waste management programs in the Commonwealth.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1401 to -1402.01 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
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accomplished within one year of the order's effective date.29
In addition, this legislation provides the DEQ with the authori-
ty to assess administrative penalties 94 of up to $10,000 with-
out the consent of the alleged violator.29
This legislation represents a significant shift from previous
authority, which allowed the assessment of administrative pen-
alties only after consent of the party.296 In a practical sense,
this legislation should enhance the DEQ's ability to address
smaller, less serious violations involving short-term cleanups or
involving small penalties, despite the lack of consent from the
party. When warranted, such cases had been referred to the
Attorney General's office to obtain injunctive relief and penal-
ties.29
7
House Bill 1412298 provided contingency measures for judi-
cial appeal standing requirements under the SWCL, SAPCL,
and the VWMA in the face of recent actions by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") on judicial
review of state agency permit actions, as well as the continuing
litigation between the Commonwealth and the EPA concerning
Virginia's implementation of Title V of the Clean Air Act
293. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1182 (Cure. Supp. 1996).
294. Administrative penalties are also referred to as civil charges. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1316(C) (Repl. Vol. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1455(F) (Repl. Vol.
1993); VA. CODE ANN. 62.1-44.15(8d) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
295. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1182 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
296. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1316(C), -1455(F) (Repl. Vol. 1993), VA. CODE ANN.
§ 62.1-44.15(8d) (Cum. Supp. 1996). The term "special orders" is already included in
the administrative order authority for the SWCB, VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(8a)-(8b)
(Curn. Supp. 1996), and the SAPCB, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1309 to -1309.1 (Repl.
Vol. 1993). Under these authorities, such special orders are orders of these respective
citizen boards rather than the DEQ and do not allow the imposition of civil charges
or penalties.
297. Because in the past the DEQ was not able to obtain administrative penalties
unilaterally, and because the formal administrative hearing process itself is relatively
cumbersome, when a case deserved both injunctive relief and an assessment of penal-
ties of some kind, the DEQ was often put in the position of having to refer the case
to the Attorney General's Office to bring a law suit. Except in emergency cases, such
litigation tends to increase significantly the time line for obtaining relief and/or penal-
ties from the alleged violator.
298. H.B. 1412, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996) (to be codified at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 10.1-1318,-1457 (Cum. Supp. 1996) (effective upon satisfaction of contingency
specified in H.B. 1412, cl. 4) and VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.26 (Cum. Supp. 1996)
(effective upon satisfaction of contingency specified in H.B. 1412, cl. 4)); see also infra
notes 313-19 and accompanying text.
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("CAA').' The EPA requires, as part of a state-run CAA pro-
gram, a relatively broad standing requirement for judicial re-
view of CAA permitting decisions. 00 The EPA also requires
similar standing opportunities for state-run Clean Water Act
("CWA') permit decisions.3"' Alternate portions of the bill are
to be implemented depending on the outcome of Virginia's liti-
gation with EPA." 2
Traditionally in Virginia, only owners aggrieved by a final
permit decision could appeal such a decision by the SWCB °3
or the SAPCB.M4 Virginia courts have interpreted this stan-
dard to include only facility owners' °5 and not third parties,
such as other citizens or environmental groups."6 The EPA
has insisted that this judicial review standard be expanded to
include such parties, ' so long as the parties meet minimum
standing requirements under Article III of the United States
299. The Commonwealth has challenged in two lawsuits several of EPA's positions
concerning judicial standing in review of final state agency air permit decisions. See
supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Title V of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7661a-f (1995), addresses operating permit requirements for facilities that emit pol-
lutants above certain levels.
300. See 59 Fed. Reg. 62,324 (1994).
301. See 61 Fed. Reg. 20,972, 20,973-74 (1996).
302. See H.B. 1412, cls. 3-4, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996).
303. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.25, -44.29 (RepL Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp.
1996).
304. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1318 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
305. See Citizens for Clean Air v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 430, 412 S.E.2d 715
(1991); Town of Fries v. State Water Control Bd., 13 Va. App. 213, 409 S.E.2d 634
(1991).
306. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Virginia State Water Control Bd., 12 Va.
App. 456, 404 S.E.2d 728 (1991).
307. In fact, the EPA specifically cited Virginia's previous standing requirement for
appeal of Virginia Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("VPDES") permit decisions
under Virginia Code § 62.1-44.29 as failing to provide adequate appeal rights for
third parties. 61 Fed. Reg. 20,973 (1996) (codified at C.F.R. § 123.30). The EPA has
taken steps to change its requirements for states who wish to implement a National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") program to require such states to
provide broader standing for appeal by third parties and citizen groups. Id. at 20,973-
174. However, the Commonwealth unsuccessfully continued its challenge of the EPA's
disapproval of its Clean Air Act State Implementation Program and Title V delega-
tion based on the EPA's requirement of a broader standing requirement to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals. See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996) (up-
holding EPA's denial of Virginia's proposed operating permit program under Title V
of the Clear Air Act).
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Constitution05 and had participated in the public comment
process."3 9
In response to the EPA's position concerning standing in
judicial appeal of air permits, one of the alternative enactments
of House Bill 1412 broadens the judicial review standard of the
State Air Pollution Control Law to include persons who meet
Article III standing requirements, have participated in a public
comment process related to the final decision of the State Air
Pollution Control Board, and have exhausted all available ad-
ministrative remedies for review of the State Air Pollution
Control Board's decision. 1 ' Standing for appeal of SWCB wa-
ter discharge permits 1' and VWMB solid and hazard waste
permitting decisions" were similarly amended. However, the
bill operates to enact the above changes only after Virginia has
obtained a "final and unappealable decision of a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction" which rules that the current air permit judi-
cial review standing is inadequate. 13
If, on the other hand, the Commonwealth prevails in its
claim, or until it loses its challenge of the EPA's interpretation,
the bill operates to change the standing for appeal of water
discharge permits from any "owner aggrieved" to any "person
aggrieved" by a final decision of the SWCB. " This last
change is to take effect as another contingency in light of the
EPA's separate rulemaking requiring states to include interest-
ed third parties other than owners in judicial reviews of water
permits."
308. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, (1982); see also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); NRDC v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir.
1992).
309. Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 877 (4th Cir. 1996).
310. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1318(B) (Cure. Supp. 1996).
311. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (Cure. Supp. 1996).
312. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1457 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
313. Act of Apr. 17, 1996, ch. 1032, cl. 4., 1996 Va. Acts. 2527.
314. Act of Apr. 17, 1996, ch. 1032, cls. 1, 3, 1996 Va. Acts 2526, 2527. This
change also makes the SWCL permit appeal standing requirement the same as the
existing standing requirement for solid and hazardous waste management permits
under the VWMA. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1457 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
315. 61 Fed. Reg. 20,972 (1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 123).
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3. Solid and Hazardous Waste Law and Brownfields
Restoration
House Bill 649"' provides local government and state agen-
cies authority to enter abandoned waste sites317 and conduct
cleanup of such sites, 8 without incurring environmental lia-
bility as site owners or operators."W This code provision may
also benefit local and state agencies in addressing certain so-
called "brownfields,""20 which do not necessarily present signif-
icant environmental concerns, but which nonetheless are prob-
lematic sites for the locality or state agency.
321
House Bill 12113' amended the Virginia Waste Manage-
ment Act ("VWMA")" to provide for enforcement and citizen
suit immunity for parties who acquire title or other property in-
terest in Superfund properties3' after an EPA-approved clean-
up has occurred." Designed to cut off the long-term threat of
regulatory and third-party liability for such sites,326 this bill
may, in conjunction with such programs as the Voluntary
Remediation Program,3 27 provide further incentive for redevel-
316. H.B. 649, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
10.1-1406.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996)).
317. Abandoned waste sites are those suffering from inadequate remediation and
financial assurance for closure and where the owner or operator cannot be located.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1406.1(A), (B) (Cum Supp. 1996).
318. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1406.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
319. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1406.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
320. Brownfields are abandoned or vacant industrial or commercial sites which typ-
ically have some environmental contamination, but which do not present enough risk
to qualify as a Superfund site. In recent years, the EPA has begun to focus on these
sites by offering grants to localities to identify them and create incentives for private
sector cleanups.
321. Such sites are often eyesores for a community and may present some degree
of risk to neighboring residents. Localities would like to cleanup the sites and convert
them to productive, tax-generating properties.
322. H.B. 1211, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
10.1-1429.4 (Cum. Supp. 1996)).
323. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1400 to -1457 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
324. The property must be listed on the National Priorities List under CERCLA,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9675 (1994).
325. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.4 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
326. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996). The bill removed liability
under the VWMA, SAPCL, SWCL, other state law, and private citizen suits for con-
tamination on, or immediately adjacent to, the property.
327. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1429.1 to -1429.3 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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opment of formerly heavily contaminated sites. Immunity under
this statutory change also extends to lenders and others who
hold a security interest in the property," enhancing the pos-
sibility of obtaining financing for such redevelopment pro-
jects.3" The purchaser of such property must not have been
under pre-existing liability under state law or regulation related
to this property.330 The immunity is only as extensive as the
scope of contamination addressed under the EPA approved
cleanup;331 therefore, liability may still arise for contamination
not addressed under the cleanup approved by the EPA. In addi-
tion, the change provides no protection at the federal level from
Superfund liability.
4. Wetlands
House Bill 11233.2 addressed recent developments in the
United States Army Corps of Engineers' ("Corps") wetlands
banking policies." These policies provide greater flexibility
for the use of wetland banking to satisfy mitigation require-
ments for wetland impacts.3" Virginia law now incorporates
the major banking mitigation tests of the Corps' new guidance
and allows such banking to be used in order to meet wetland
mitigation requirements which may be required under state
law.35  This legislation may enhance the development of
wetland banks as commercial enterprises by ensuring a greater
demand in the state for wetland banking mitigation. It also
328. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.4(A) (Curn. Supp. 1996).
329. Lenders have been hesitant to lend to would-be redevelopers of contaminated
sites for fear of potential Superfund or other cleanup liability.
330. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.4(A) (Cun Supp. 1996).
331. Id.
332. H.B. 1123, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
28.2-1308(C) (Cum. Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-223.2:1 (Repl. Vol. 1996); VA.
CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:5(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996)).
333. 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605 (1995).
334. Id. The Corps requires that impacts to wetlands be corrected and/or mitigated
through remediation of harm or other on-site or off-site wetland enhancement or
preservation projects. Id.
335. See VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-1308(C) (Cum. Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-
223.2:1 (Repl. Vol. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:5(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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provides greater consistency between state law and federal
guidance related to flexibility in the use of wetland banking in
the mitigation process.
5. Petroleum Storage Tank and Oil Discharge
House Bill 591V3 reformed the lender liability provisions of
underground storage tank provisions of the SWCL, minimizing
potential liability where the subject property is held as part of
a security interest in the property.37 This amendment also
permits lenders to conduct cleanups of leaking underground
storage tanks and to seek reimbursement from the Virginia
Petroleum Storage Tank Fund8' established under the SWCL
for such cleanups.3 9 This bill should have a significant impact
on banks' and other lenders' willingness to provide financing for
sites which are known to have underground storage tanks on
the property, but which may present potential environmental
risks.
House Bill 1167' incorporated various other changes to the
SWCL's underground storage tank provisions, the Virginia Pe-
troleum Storage Tank Fund,"' and the financial responsibility
requirements for underground storage tanks ("UST").' First,
heating oil USTs greater than 5,000 gallons used for onsite
storage are no longer exempt from the definition of "under-
ground storage tank."' Therefore, owners and grantors will
need to include these tanks in financial assurance calculations
336. H.B. 591, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
62.1-44.34:8, -44.34:10, -44.34:11 (Cum. Supp. 1996)).
337. The bill excludes from the definition of "Owner of an underground storage
tank" a person who holds only a security interest in the tank who has not participat-
ed in the management of the tank or been involved in petroleum operations or busi-
ness. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.144.34:8, -44.34:10 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
338. The Virginia Petroleum Storage Tank Fund is a revolving fund established in
part to reimburse owners and operators for qualifying tank cleanup costs. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 62.144.34:11 (Cur. Supp. 1996).
339. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:11(q) (Cur. Supp. 1996).
340. H.B. 1167, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996) (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 62.1-44.34:8, 44.34:14, 44.34:15.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996)).
341. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.144.34:11 (Cur. Supp. 1996).
342. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.144.34:12 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
343. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.144.34:8, 44.34:10 (Cum- Supp. 1996).
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and reporting.' Second, House Bill 1167 created a new defi-
nition for "responsible person." The new definition establishes
that the person who is the owner or operator of an under-
ground storage tank or an aboveground storage tank at the
time of release therefrom is reported to the Board, and not
necessarily the owner operator who caused the release, is the
party against whom State Water Control Board ("SWCB") or
DEQ may enforce cleanup responsibility.' Third, the Bill re-
moved from the previous version of the statute the requirement
that underground storage tank vendors maintain financial re-
sponsibility."
Another significant change made by House Bill 1167 is to
establish that in most cases the costs being reimbursed by the
Virginia Petroleum Storage Tank Fund must be "reasonable
and necessary per occurrence costs."" Thus, the General As-
sembly codified the policy position of the DEQ that such per
occurrence cost must be reasonable and necessary.' The Bill
also changed the types of products which are to be taxed as
part of the revenue generation to finance the Virginia Petro-
leum Storage Tank Fund." In addition, the Bill made clear
that owners or operators of an underground storage tank or an
aboveground storage tank facility who fail to report a release of
petroleum or discharge of oil to the SWCB, as called for under
applicable federal, state and local law, shall not be eligible for
reimbursement from the Virginia Petroleum Storage Tank Fund
for any cleanup of such releases or discharges.s0 Finally, the
Bill amended the SWCL to require that the Virginia Petroleum
Storage Tank Fund balance be kept at a sufficient amount to
serve as an adequate financial responsibility demonstration
mechanism for underground storage tank owners and opera-
344. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:12(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
345. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:8 (Cum. Supp. 1996); see also VA. CODE ANN. §
62.1-44.34:9.(1), (9) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
346. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:12(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
347. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:11(A)(2)(a)-(d), (h) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
348. DEQ's interpretation of "reasonable and necessary" is set forth in its VIRGINIA
DEP'T OF ENVTL. QuALrry GUIDANCE MANUAL: REIMBURSEMENT CLAIM PROCESS FOR
THE VIRGINIA PETROLEUM STORAGE TANK FUND at 18 (March 1, 1995).
349. The Bill adds dyed diesel fuel, but deletes aviation special fuel sold, delivered
or used, and natural gas or liquefied petroleum gases imported, sold or used in the
Commonwealth. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:13(A)(1) (Cum Supp. 1996).
350. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:11(A)(9) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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tors.35' However, passage of the Bill also allows the SWCB to
pay reduced reimbursements, or delay such reimbursements on
a temporary basis, if such action is necessary to maintain an
adequate balance in the Fund.352
6. Land Use
There was little in the way of environmentally related land
use bills promulgated this past year. Under House Bill
1522," local governments are now required to include miner-
al resources"M in their consideration of local comprehensive
planning.
7. Air Law
House Bill 1512"s represents a direct challenge to the
EPA's attempt to organize states in the development of regional
standards for ozone emissions and their transport across state
lines. Thus, this bill effectively prevents Virginia from entering
into agreement with, or joining, the Ozone Transport Commis-
sion consisting of the northeastern states, or any similar
multi-state organization designed to develop such standards,
without express consent of the General Assembly.357
351. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.3411(A)(10) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
352. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44,34:11(A)(10) (Cum Supp. 1996).
353. H.B. 1522, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996) (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 15.1-427, -446.1, -447 (Cum. Supp. 1996)).
354. "Mineral resources" is not defined in the Bill.
355. H.B. 1512, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996).
356. Ozone Transport Commission was created by the Clean Air Amendments of
1990 to establish a multi-state cooperative organization which would study the effects
of cross boundary movement of ground level ozone and the need to establish restric-
tions on emissions of ozone causing pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. 7511c(a) (1994).
357. H.B. 1512, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1992). In House Bill 1512, the
General Assembly made it clear that, because of the pending challenge to the consti-
tutionality of the Ozone Transport Commission, as well as expressed desire for fur-
ther study of causes of and the effects of a cross state movement of ozone, the Gen-
eral Assembly has severely curtailed the ability of the DEQ to participate in the
activities of the Ozone Transport Commission or any similar multi-state organizations.
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The period of June 1995 through June 1996 brought signif-
icant and various developments in Virginia's environmental law
and related tort and land use laws. Continuing struggles be-
tween the Commonwealth and the EPA related to implementa-
tion of various aspects of the delegated programs under the
Clean Air Act and perhaps the Clean Water Act may continue.
Whether Seminole Tribe v. State of Florida358 and United
States v. Olin359 will have any material impact on environ-
mental actions remains to be seen, but some ground work has
already been laid with these cases for potential shifts in the
federal-state relationship under major environmental programs.
Congress' attempts to resolve differences in needed reform of
Superfund, the Safe Drinking Water Act, Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Clean Water Act may bring
further charges at the federal level. In any event, the General
Assembly continues to make its mark on Virginia's environmen-
tal laws, and with Virginia's gubernatorial election coming in
the fall of 1997, Virginia environmental law will likely continue
its evolution at an even quicker pace.
358. 116 S. Ct. 1114.
359. 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
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